




Relative Nash welfarism is a solution to the problem of aggregating von Neumann-
Morgenstern preferences over a set of lotteries. It ranks such lotteries according to the
product of any collection of 0—normalized von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities they
generate. We show that this criterion is characterized by the Weak Pareto Principle,
Anonymity, and Independence of Harmless Expansions: the social ranking of two
lotteries is unaffected by the addition of any alternative that every agent deems at
least as good as the one she originally found worst. Relative Nash welfarism is more
appealing than relative utilitarianism in contexts where the best relevant alternative
for an agent is diffi cult to identify with confidence.
Keywords: preference aggregation, lotteries, relative utilitarianism, Nash prod-
uct.
JEL classification numbers: D63, D71.
1. Introduction
The most popular solution to the problem of aggregating von Neumann-Morgenstern (here-
after, vN-M) preference orderings over a set of lotteries is relative utilitarianism : Dhillon
(1998), Karni (1998), Dhillon and Mertens (1999), Segal (2000), Börgers and Choo (2017).
It consists in ranking such lotteries according to the sum of the (0, 1)-normalized von
Neumann-Morgenstern utilities they generate. Contrary to Harsanyi’s (1955) classical
utilitarianism, relative utilitarianism does not require an a priori knowledge of individual
utilities and therefore constitutes a bona fide ordinal aggregation rule.
Of course, the recommended social ranking of two lotteries depends upon the set of
(pure) alternatives that are considered relevant. In particular, it may be affected by the
addition of an alternative that an individual deems worse than the one she initially found
worst, or better than the one she initially found best. In many applications, identifying
∗Département de Sciences Économiques and CIREQ, Université de Montréal, C.P. 6128, succursale
centre-ville, Montréal QC, H3C 3J7, Canada (yves.sprumont@umontreal.ca). I thank M. Amarante
and S. Horan for many discussions on the subject of this note, M. Kaneko for useful comments, and the
FRQSC for financial support.
the worst relevant alternative for each individual may be relatively easy, but determining
the best one is diffi cult.
As an illustration, consider the problem of developing medical treatment against two
diseases, A and B. Let xd denote the quality of the treatment developed against disease
d : say that xd = 0 if no treatment exists, xd = 12 if a good treatment is made available,
and xd = 1 if the treatment is excellent (these numbers are a convenient way of indexing
the possibilities but have no meaning —we could use xd = α, β, γ instead). The relevant
















Agent 1 suffers from disease A; her preferences over the lotteries on X are represented
by the vN-M utility function u1(x) = xA on X. Agent 2 suffers from disease B and her
preferences admit the vN-M representation u2(x) = xB. Observe that, given X, the func-
tions u1, u2 are (0, 1)-normalized: minX ui = 0 and maxX ui = 1 for i = 1, 2. Relative
utilitarianism deems the alternatives (1
2
, 0) and (0, 1
2
) equally good because both generate
a sum of (0, 1)-normalized utilities equal to 1
2
.
Suppose now that, in fact, an excellent treatment cannot possibly be developed against















Given Y, the (0, 1)-normalized vN-M representations of the preferences are now v1(x) =




Thus, in order to decide whether a good treatment against A (and no treatment against
B) is preferable to a good treatment against B (and no treatment against A), society needs
to know whether an excellent treatment against B (and A) is possible or not. There need
not be anything morally wrong with this view, but it may be diffi cult to implement in
practice.
In contexts where the best relevant alternative for each individual is hard to deter-
mine, we submit that relative Nash welfarism is a more appealing criterion. It works as
follows: choose for each possible individual preference ordering an arbitrary 0-normalized
von Neumann-Morgenstern representation; at any preference profile, rank lotteries accord-
ing to the product of the 0-normalized utilities they generate. The choice of the particular
0-normalizations is irrelevant because all 0-normalized von Neumann-Morgenstern numer-
ical representations of a given preference ordering are positive multiples of each other.
In the example above, u1, u2 are 0-normalized for both X and Y : minX ui = minY ui =
0 for i = 1, 2. Relative Nash welfarism deems the alternatives (1
2
, 0) and (0, 1
2
) equally good
independently of whether the set of relevant alternatives is X or Y. Of course, the social
preference still requires a correct specification of the worst relevant alternative for each
individual. In many cases, this may not be an impossible task.
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This example illustrates a general property of the relative Nash ranking: it is unaffected
by the addition of any alternative that all individuals find at least as good as the one
they initially found worst —even if such a new alternative is better than the one they
initially found best. We show that relative Nash welfarism is the only weakly Paretian and
anonymous criterion satisfying this “Independence of Harmless Alternatives”property.
Our theorem is a variant of the result offered by Kaneko and Nakamura (1979). There
are three differences. The first and most important one is conceptual: Kaneko and Naka-
mura’s analysis is restricted to problems where all agents agree on what the worst relevant
alternative is: a lottery is then evaluated according to the product of the vN-M utility gains
it generates with respect to this common worst alternative. The scope of applicability of
relative Nash welfarism, as we define it, is much broader: just like relative utilitarianism, it
allows society to rank the set of lotteries generated by a finite collection of alternatives for
any profile of vN-M preferences. When the agents disagree on which alternative is worst,
the vN-M utility gain of each agent is measured with respect to the alternative that she
finds worst, and a lottery is evaluated according to the product of the vN-M utility gains
computed in this way.
The remaining two differences are technical, though important. Kaneko and Naka-
mura’s independence axiom embodies an assumption of neutrality which we dispense with,
and a continuity axiom which we also do not require. Note that Kaneko (1984) also dis-
penses with continuity, albeit in a framework with a continuum of individuals.
2. Framework
Let A be an infinite set of conceivable (social) alternatives and let A be the set of fi-
nite subsets of A containing at least two elements. For each X ∈ A, let ∆(X) ={
a ∈ [0, 1]X |
∑
x∈X a(x) = 1
}
be the set of lotteries on X. The elements of X are the
relevant alternatives and the elements of ∆(X) are the relevant lotteries. If x ∈ X, we
abuse notation and also use x to denote the lottery in ∆(X) assigning probability 1 to the
alternative x.
For any X ∈ A, a preference ordering over ∆(X) is an ordering R ⊆ ∆(X) × ∆(X).
We call R non-degenerate if R 6= ∆(X)×∆(X). A vN-M representation of R is a function
u : ∆(X)→ R such (i) u(a) ≥ u(b)⇔ aRb for all a, b ∈ ∆(X) and (ii) u(λa+ (1− λ)b) =
λu(a) + (1− λ)u(b) for all a, b ∈ ∆(X) and all λ ∈ [0, 1] . If such a function exists, R is a
vN-M preference ordering. We call a function u satisfying condition (ii) a vNM function.
Let R(X) denote the set of all preference orderings over ∆(X) and let R∗(X) denote
the subset of non-degenerate vN-M preference orderings. Write R = ∪X∈AR(X) and
R∗ = ∪X∈AR∗(X).
Let N = {1, ..., n} be a fixed finite set of individuals. A (social choice) problem is a list
(X,RN) where X ∈ A and RN = (R1, ..., Rn) ∈ R∗(X)N . We simply call RN a preference
profile —but keep in mind that R1, ..., Rn are non-degenerate vN-M preference orderings.
The set of all problems is denoted by P. An (aggregation) rule is a mapping R : P → R
such that R(X,RN) ∈ R(X) for every (X,RN) ∈ P . Note that the social preference
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ordering R(X,RN) need not be a vN-M preference ordering and may be degenerate.
3. Theorem
For any i ∈ N, X ∈ A, and Ri ∈ R∗(X), denote by A0(X,Ri) and A1(X,Ri) the sets
of worst and best lotteries in ∆(X) according to Ri. A vN-M representation ui of Ri is
0-normalized if ui(a) = 0 for all a ∈ A0(X,Ri). It is (0, 1)-normalized if, in addition,
ui(a) = 1 for all a ∈ A1(X,Ri). We denote by U0(X,Ri) the set of 0-normalized vN-M
representations of Ri : observe that if ui ∈ U0(X,Ri), then vi ∈ U0(X,Ri) if and only if
vi = λui for some positive real number λ. The (0, 1)-normalized vN-M representation of
Ri is unique: we denote it u∗(., X,Ri).
The relative Nash aggregation rule R∗ is defined as follows: for all (X,RN) ∈ P and











Since every 0-normalized vN-M representation of Ri is a positive linear transformation of








The following notation and terminology will be needed to state our axiomatic charac-
terization of the relative Nash aggregation rule. The symbols Pi and Ii denote the strict
preference and indifference relations associated with the individual preference ordering Ri,
and P(X,RN) and I(X,RN) are the strict social preference and indifference relations as-
sociated with R(X,RN). We denote by Π(N) the set of permutations on N. If RN is a
preference profile on ∆(X) and σ ∈ Π(N), then σRN = (σR1, ..., σRn) is the profile on
∆(X) given by σRσ(i) = Ri for all i ∈ N. Finally, if (X,RN), (X ′, R′N) ∈ P andX ⊆ X ′, we
say thatR′N coincides withRN on∆(X) ifR
′
i∩(∆(X)×∆(X)) = Ri for all i ∈ N. Similarly,
R(X ′, R′N) coincides withR(X,RN) on∆(X) ifR(X
′, R′N)∩(∆(X)×∆(X)) = R(X,RN).
The conditions we impose on the rule R are the following.
Weak Pareto Principle. For all (X,RN) ∈ P and a, b ∈ ∆(X), (i) if aPib for all i ∈ N ,
then aP(X,RN)b, and (i) if aIib for all i ∈ N , then aI(X,RN)b.
We refer to part (ii) of this condition as Pareto Indifference.
Anonymity. For all (X,RN) ∈ P and σ ∈ Π(N), R(X,RN) = R(X, σRN).
Independence of Harmless Expansions. For all (X,RN), (X ′, R′N) ∈ P, if X ⊆ X ′,
R′N coincides with RN on ∆(X), and a
′R′iai for all a
′ ∈ X ′, all ai ∈ A0(X,Ri), and all
i ∈ N, then R(X ′, R′N) coincides with R(X,RN) on ∆(X).
These three conditions characterize relative Nash welfarism:
Theorem. The aggregation rule R satisfies the Weak Pareto Principle, Anonymity, and
Independence of Harmless Expansions if and only if R = R∗.
4
4. Proof
We begin with a lemma showing that Pareto Indifference and Independence of Harmless
Expansions implies a strong form of neutrality. Let Π(A) denote the set of permutations
on A. If (X,RN) ∈ P , π ∈ Π(A), a ∈ ∆(X), and RN ∈ R∗(X)N , denote by aπ the lottery
on π(X) given by aπ(π(x)) = a(x) for all x ∈ X, and denote by RπN the preference profile
on π(X) given by aπRπi b
π ⇔ aRib for all i ∈ N and all a, b ∈ ∆(X).
Neutrality. For all (X,RN) ∈ P, a, b ∈ ∆(X) and π ∈ Π(A), aR(X,RN)b⇔ aπR(π(X),
RπN)b
π.
Lemma. If the aggregation rule R satisfies Pareto Indifference and Independence of
Harmless Expansions, then R satisfies Neutrality.
This result is a corollary to Lemma 1 in Sprumont (2013); we include a full proof here
to make the presentation self-contained.
Proof. Let R satisfy Pareto Indifference and Independence of Harmless Expansions. Let
(X,RN) ∈ P, a, b ∈ ∆(X) and π ∈ Π(A).We prove that aR(X,RN)b⇒ aπR(π(X), RπN)bπ.
The converse implication follows immediately since a = (aπ)π
−1
, b = (bπ)π
−1
, X = π−1(π(X)),
and RN = (RπN)
π−1 . Let us thus assume that
aR(X,RN)b. (4.1)
Step 1. aπR(π(X), RπN)b
π if π(X) ∩X = ∅.
Let X = X ∪π(X). For each i ∈ N , let Ri be the vN-M preference ordering over ∆(X)
which coincides with Ri on ∆(X) and is such that xI iπ(x) for all x ∈ X. This is well
defined because π(X)∩X = ∅. Observe that Ri coincides with Rπi on ∆(π(X)). Moreover,
xRia for all x ∈ X and all a ∈ A0(X,Ri)∪A0(π(X), Rπi ). Let RN = (R1, ..., Rn). Applying
Independence of Harmless Expansions to (4.1),
aR(X,RN)b. (4.2)
Since aπI ia and bπI ib for all i ∈ N, Pareto Indifference implies aπI(X,RN)a and
bπI(X,RN)b. Hence from (4.2),
aπR(X,RN)b
π. (4.3)
Applying Independence of Harmless Expansions to (4.3) and recalling that RN coincides
with RπN on ∆(π(X)), we obtain a
πR(π(X), RπN)b
π.
Step 2. aπR(π(X), RπN)b
π.
Choose ρ ∈ Π(A) such that ρ(X) ∩X = ρ(X) ∩ π(X) = ∅. By Step 1, (4.1) implies
aρR(ρ(X), RρN)b
ρ. (4.4)










By definition, (π ◦ ρ−1)(ρ(X)) = π(X). Moreover, (aρ)π◦ρ−1 = aπ since (aρ)π◦ρ−1(π(x))
= (aρ)π◦ρ
−1
((π ◦ ρ−1)(ρ(x))) = aρ(ρ(x)) = a(x) for all x ∈ X. Likewise, (bρ)π◦ρ−1 = bπ and
(RρN)
π◦ρ−1 = RπN . Hence (4.5) reduces to a
πR(π(X), RπN)b
π. 
Proof of the Theorem. The proof of the “if” statement is straightforward. To prove
the converse statement, fix an aggregation rule R satisfying the Weak Pareto Principle,
Anonymity, and Independence of Harmless Expansions. This rule satisfies Pareto Indiffer-
ence, hence also Neutrality, by the above lemma.
If (X,RN) ∈ P and ui ∈ U0(X,Ri) for each i ∈ N, define uN : ∆(X) → RN+ by
uN(a) = (u1(a), ..., un(a)) for all a ∈ ∆(X).With some abuse of notation, let U0(X,RN) =∏
i∈N
U0(X,Ri). Define the binary relations , ∼, and % on RN+ as follows:
(i) v  w if and only if there exist (X,RN) ∈ P , uN ∈ U0(X,RN), and a, b ∈ X such that
uN(a) = v, uN(b) = w, and aP(X,RN)b,
(ii) v ∼ w if and only if there exist (X,RN) ∈ P , uN ∈ U0(X,RN), and a, b ∈ X such that
uN(a) = v, uN(b) = w, and aI(X,RN)b,
(iii) v % w if and only if v  w or v ∼ w.
Step 1. % is an ordering.
To prove reflexivity and completeness of %, fix two (possibly equal) vectors v, w ∈ RN+ .
Let a, b, c, d ∈ A be four distinct alternatives and let X = {a, b, c, d} . For each i ∈ N,
choose a number zi ∈ R+ such that zi 6= vi, wi, and let ui : ∆(X) → R+ be the (unique)
vN-M function such that ui(a) = vi, ui(b) = wi, ui(c) = 0, and ui(d) = zi. Let Ri be the
preference ordering on ∆(X) represented by ui : by construction, Ri ∈ R∗(X). Letting
uN := (u1, ..., un) and RN = (R1, ..., RN), we have (X,RN) ∈ P and uN ∈ U0(X,RN). Since
R(X,RN) is complete and reflexive, aR(X,RN)b or bR(X,RN)a, implying that v % w or
w % v.
To prove transitivity of %, fix v1, v2, v3 ∈ RN+ such that v1 % v2 % v3. By definition,
there exist (X1, R1N), (X
2, R2N) ∈ P , u1N ∈ U0(X1, R1N), u2N ∈ U0(X2, R2N), a1, b1 ∈ X1, and
a2, b2 ∈ X2 such that
u1N(a
1) = v1, u1N(b
1) = v2 = u2N(a
2), and u2N(b
2) = v3, (4.6)
and
a1R(X1, R1N)b
1 and a2R(X2, R2N)b
2. (4.7)
By Neutrality, we may assume that X1 ∩X2 = ∅. Let X = X1 ∪X2. For each i ∈ N,
let ui : ∆(X)→ R+ be the vN-M function such that
ui(x) =
{
u1i (x) if x ∈ X1,
u2i (x) if x ∈ X2.
(4.8)
Let Ri be the vN-M preference ordering on ∆(X) represented by ui, let uN = (u1, ..., un),
and let RN = (R1, ..., Rn).
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Note that RN coincides with R1N on ∆(X
1) and with R2N on ∆(X
2). Moreover, because
u1N ∈ U0(X1, R1N) and u2N ∈ U0(X2, R2N), (4.8) implies that xRiai for all x ∈ X, all
ai ∈ A0(X1, R1i ) ∪ A0(X2, R2i ), and all i ∈ N. We may therefore apply Independence of
Harmless Expansions to (4.7) and conclude
a1R(X,RN)b
1 and a2R(X,RN)b2.
On the other hand, (4.6) and (4.8) imply b1Iia2 for all i ∈ N , hence by Pareto Indifference,
b1I(X,RN)a
2.
Transitivity of R(X,RN) now implies a1R(X,RN)b2. Since (X,RN) ∈ P , uN ∈ U0(X,RN),
and uN(a1) = v1 and uN(b2) = v3, the definition of % gives us v1 % v3.






wi for all v, w ∈ RN+ .
We use the notation ≥, >, to write inequalities in RN+ . Because R satisfies the Weak
Pareto Principle, the ordering % is weakly monotonic: v  w ⇒ v  w. BecauseR satisfies
Anonymity, ∼ is symmetric: v ∼ σv for all σ ∈ Π(N), where σv is the vector defined
by (σv)σ(i) = vi for all i ∈ N. Finally, because R satisfies Independence of Harmless
Alternatives, % is scale invariant : v % w ⇔ λ ∗ v % λ ∗ w for all λ ∈ RN++, where
λ ∗ v = (λ1v1, ..., λnvn). We omit the straightforward proofs of these three facts.





vi) for all v ∈ RN+ .
For k = 0, ..., n, define V k =
{
v ∈ RN+ | {i ∈ N | vi 6= 1} ≤ k
}
, the set of vectors in RN+
having at most k coordinates different from 1. Note that V 0 = {(1, ..., 1)} and V n = RN+ .
Trivially,





vi) for all v ∈ V 0.
Next, we proceed by induction: we fix k such that 0 ≤ k < n, make the induction
hypothesis





vi) for all v ∈ V k.





vi) for all v ∈ V k+1.
Let v ∈ V k+1 and, to avoid triviality, suppose v /∈ V k : exactly k + 1 coordinates of
v differ from 1. Without loss of generality, say v = (v1, ..., vk+1, 1, ..., 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−k−1
), with vi 6= 1 for
i = 1, ..., k + 1. By symmetry of ∼,
(v1, ..., vk, 1, ..., 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−k




Since % is scale invariant, (4.9) implies
v ∼ (v1, ..., vk−1, 1, vk · vk+1, 1, ..., 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−k−1
).
By the induction hypothesis,
(v1, ..., vk−1, 1, vk · vk+1, 1, ..., 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−k−1






hence by transitivity of ∼,


























i ) for all v ∈ RN+ . (4.10)








































































































































and, by transitivity of %, v  w. 
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